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1946: The Year Canada Chose its Path 
in the Arctic
Peter Kikkert
Concerns over Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic have arisen inter-mittently since the Second World War, provoking national anxiety. “Arctic sovereignty seems to be the zombie – the dead issue that re-
fuses to stay dead – of Canadian public affairs,” explain the authors of Arctic 
Front. “You think its settled, killed and buried, and then every decade or so 
it rises from the grave and totters into view again.”1 The gravest sovereignty 
crises that Canada faced historically shared two distinct features: they in-
volved the Americans and they forced Canadian governments, both Liberal 
and Conservative, to choose between adopting a gradualist or activist stance 
on Arctic sovereignty. The gradualist approach is the more cautious of the 
two responses, characterized by careful negotiations and quiet diplomacy to 
achieve an implicit or explicit recognition of Canada’s sovereignty. Gradualists 
argue that sovereignty is strengthened over time and wish to avoid overly 
aggressive acts that might jeopardize Canada’s claims.2 An activist approach 
involves a more forthright and forceful pronouncement of Canadian sover-
eignty, such as the drawing of straight baselines by the Mulroney government. 
Both approaches seek the same objectives: the attainment of international 
recognition of Canada’s de jure sovereignty over the North, especially by the 
United States, and of de facto control of the Arctic lands and waters.3 
Canadian diplomats have had to walk a fine line in deciding how far 
to push the boundaries of international law and test the patience of the 
Americans in affirming Canada’s sovereignty. For the most part, decision 
makers weighed the costs and benefits of a forceful assertion of sovereignty 
and erred on the side of caution. In the years of the early Cold War, the 
Liberal government faced this dilemma as the exigencies of continental de-
fence brought the world’s attention squarely on the Arctic.
The Canadian decision to cooperate with the United States in contin-
ental defence and allow American defence projects in the North, the terms 
under which the two countries worked this relationship out, and its impact 
on Canadian sovereignty in the region has generated three distinct schools 
of thought. The first school reflects the ideas of Donald Creighton’s seminal 
work The Forked Road, which proposed that the government of William Lyon 
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Mackenzie King led Canada into the suffocating embrace of the Americans, 
who ignored Canada’s wishes and threatened its sovereignty in the North 
with several massive wartime defence projects.4 Other scholars have ex-
panded on this theme of American dominance and Canadian weakness in 
protecting its North. In Sovereignty or Security?, Shelagh Grant alleged that 
Canada sacrificed its control of the North to meet American continental de-
fence needs and failed to protect its sovereignty.5 In his quick survey of Arctic 
policy, “Lock, Stock and Icebergs?,” historian Adam Lajeunesse also sharply 
criticized the Canadian government for not adopting a sufficiently aggres-
sive approach to defend sovereignty after 1946. “The situation,” he claimed, 
“seemed to call for a clarification of official Arctic policy and a more forceful 
assertion of Canadian control.”6 Instead of adopting a strong course of action, 
the Canadians passively established a policy of purposeful ambiguity and 
tried their best to avoid the real issues of Arctic sovereignty. 
The second school, aptly named the “middle ground,”7 which began 
with the work of Charles Stacey and James Eayrs and includes historians 
like Morris Zaslow and Jack Granatstein, stressed the conflict, cooperation 
and complexity of the Canadian-American relationship. Though Canada 
struggled with the inevitable consequences to its sovereignty, it remained 
an important ally to the United States and had to participate in continental 
defence.8 Arguing that Canada acted as required, given the prevailing Cold 
War context, these scholars rarely provided any praise for the government’s 
handling of the situation and ignored Canadian accomplishments in preserv-
ing its sovereignty while ensuring security. 
The third line of thought, which can be called the revisionist school, 
challenges these interpretations. David Bercuson, Whitney Lackenbauer, 
Elizabeth Elliot-Miesel and Joseph Jockel have emphasized the cooperation, 
respect and open dialogue that characterized the defence relationship after 
1943. Their work illuminates the victories of the Canadian government in 
safeguarding its sovereignty while ensuring its security.9 Canadian man-
oeuvring led to American recognition of Canada’s terrestrial sovereignty in 
the Arctic from 1947 onwards, they argue, and effectively balanced security 
and sovereignty needs. 
This chapter elaborates on the basic argument David Bercuson made in 
his seminal article, “Continental Defence and Arctic Sovereignty, 1945-1950: 
Solving the Canadian Dilemma,” by focusing on the bilateral defence nego-
tiations that occurred throughout 1946, culminating in the Chateau Laurier 
conference of 16-17 December. These discussions formed a strong foundation 
for the Canadian-American defence relationship that developed through 
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the Cold War. Given its strategic position and its historic alliance with the 
United States, Canada had to participate in continental defence. Canadian 
officials understood, however, that a purely passive approach to northern 
sovereignty and security could only end in disaster. In this long and trying 
year they worked out a solution that offered both. 
Critics such as Grant and Lajeunesse, who assert that Canada could 
have pushed the United States into formally accepting its sovereignty, show 
a misunderstanding of the relationships that existed at the time, the essence 
of the negotiations, the state of international law, and the potential costs and 
benefits of certain Canadian courses of action. Indeed, Canada’s cautious and 
gradualist strategy allowed the country to consolidate its territorial sover-
eignty over the Arctic lands. While agreeing to disagree about controversial 
legal issues like the sector principle, the two countries negotiated workable 
solutions that supported Canadian claims in the region.10 Although quiet 
diplomacy lacked the glamour of a grand sovereignty-asserting action, 
Canada managed to avoid alienating its chief ally, contributed to continental 
defence, and laid the groundwork for a strategy that secured Canada’s na-
tional interests in the Arctic.
In the Shadow of the Second World War
In August 1945 Germany and Japan lay in ruins, and people everywhere 
anticipated a new era of peace. After six long years of war, the Canadian 
government looked forward to cutting down on defence expenditures and 
investing its resources in areas neglected during the conflict. Canada could 
be proud of its wartime service as one of the leading members of the Western 
alliance. Furthermore, the politicians could breathe a sigh of relief that the 
thousands of American troops who flooded into the Canadian North after 
1941 in the name of continental defence would finally leave. 
Though in 1942 and much of 1943 the King government did little to 
regulate the activities of the Americans in the North, the Canadians eventu-
ally became more proactive and started to manage events ‘on the ground.’ 
The government appointed a special commissioner, Brigadier-General W.W. 
Foster, to oversee the American defence projects in the North and started 
to set parameters on new American proposals. As the war drew to a close, 
Canada secured its control by paying to acquire full ownership of the perma-
nent facilities on its territory. The Americans also agreed that, before they 
began any project on or over Canadian territory, they required approval from 
the Canadian government.11 With the threat to the continent gone and the 
Canadians assuming control of the northern defence projects, the Americans 
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had little reason to stay in the region. Indeed, by the summer of 1945, most 
had gone home. 
The Canadian effort to secure its control of the North in the last years 
of the war was timely because the post war international situation prompt-
ed immediate American requests to return to the region. Even before the 
Japanese capitulation in August 1945, the wartime relationship between the 
Western allies and the Soviet Union began to dissolve. On 11 September 1945, 
this fact became all too apparent to the King government, which desperately 
wanted to avoid becoming embroiled in another global crisis. Igor Gouzenko, 
a cipher clerk at the Soviet embassy in Ottawa, provided evidence of an ex-
tensive spy network that reached into the Department of External Affairs, the 
labs of Canada’s atomic program, and the bureaucracies of its senior allies. 
A discouraged King remarked “if there is another war, it will come against 
America by way of Canada from Russia.”12 The Arctic, King implied, had just 
become one of the most strategic positions in the world.
In the ensuing months tensions continued to mount between the East 
and the West. While several Canadian analysts urged the West to adopt a 
more conciliatory approach to the Soviet Union,13 concerns over the security 
of the North American continent continued to grow in the minds of Canadian 
and American officials. Led by American A.D. de Seversky, military thinkers 
unrolled polar projection maps in place of their old Mercator projections, and 
the proximity of the United States to the Soviet Union became strikingly ob-
vious. Vilhjalmur Steffanson’s much publicized idea of the Arctic becoming 
the world’s ‘new Mediterranean’ no longer seemed so far-fetched.14 With the 
enemy waiting ominously across the North Pole while the technological ad-
vances of the war slowly strengthened its military arsenal, many strategists 
came to see the Arctic as North America’s Achilles heel. Although the Soviet 
Union possessed only a small strategic bomber force and no aircraft capable 
of making a round trip bombing mission to the United States, American mil-
itary strategists and the press obsessed over the idea of enemy planes coming 
over the Pole to launch raids on the continent’s industrial heartland. On 5 
December 1945 General H.H. Arnold, Commander in Chief of the United 
States Army Air Force (USAAF), the service most worried by the aerial threat, 
declared to the public that the Arctic would be the heart of any new conflict.15 
The strategic importance of Alaska and the Canadian North continued to 
grow in the minds of defence planners in the years ahead. 
Although these fears did not run rampant in Ottawa, wartime and early 
postwar Canadian military operations in subarctic and arctic conditions 
actually convinced some government officials that the northern approaches 
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could become the focus of an attack by hostile ground forces.16 In the late win-
ter and spring of 1945 the Canadian military undertook Exercise Polar Bear in 
northern British Columbia and Exercise Lemming in northern Manitoba and 
the southern portion of the Northwest Territories.17 These exercises, coupled 
with technological developments, led defence planners to claim “that the 
inaccessibility of the Arctic is just another myth, and, providing supplies 
are ensured, operations on the barren grounds which represent one-third of 
Canada’s area can be as unhindered as operations on the Libyan Desert.”18 
Officials worried that the enemy might use a diversionary land assault in 
the North to tie down large numbers of friendly forces. In the winter of 1946 
the Canadians conducted another large-scale exercise, Operation Musk Ox, 
which gained international attention.19 In light of these new aerial and land 
threats Canadian decision makers foresaw that the Americans would soon 
be pressuring them to assist in continental defence. 
In the last months of 1945, the American defence planners started to 
press their Canadian counterparts to assist in reassessing continental defence 
needs based on the new international situation and the potential threats it 
created. In November the American section of the Permanent Joint Board on 
Defence (PJBD) suggested that a joint revision of ABC-22, the wartime de-
fence plan, be undertaken as quickly as possible.20 The Canadians embraced 
the opportunity, understanding the process would allow them to learn 
as much as possible about American plans and assessments, help them to 
prepare for the responsibilities the United States would impose on Canada, 
and give them the opportunity to assist in preparing specific defence plans. 
Almost immediately, however, concerns grew amongst Canadian officials in 
Washington that the PJBD was starting premature and improper planning 
for a formal defence treaty.21 Since the war, Canada had managed to create 
some breathing room between it and the behemoth to the south and the pros-
pect of an even closer and connected defence relationship was disconcerting 
to politicians and some senior bureaucrats. The Canadians, however, had 
learned valuable lessons from the Second World War. Their attitude and ap-
proach changed, and they would not repeat the mistakes – or the apathy – of 
1942 and 1943. 
A New Canadian Approach
How could Canada handle the Americans and their defence needs? This 
was one of the most pressing questions facing External Affairs during 
the last two years of the war. As the Minister-Counselor at the Canadian 
Legation in Washington, Lester B. Pearson criticized the overbearing 
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Map 3. From C.S. Beals, Science, History and Hudson Bay (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1968).
Americans, as well as the Canadian habit of taking a hard line on issues 
and then simply giving in when the Americans applied any pressure.22 
“When we are dealing with such a powerful neighbour, we have to avoid 
the twin dangers of subservience and truculent touchiness,” he suggested in 
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1944. “We succumb to the former when we take everything lying down, and 
to the latter when we rush to the State Department with a note every time 
some Congressman makes a stupid statement about Canada…”23 When it 
found an issue worth fighting over, Pearson insisted that Canada should “go 
to the mat with Washington” and pursue the matter until the end.24 During 
the early Cold War era, Canada followed this advice while keeping its close 
bilateral relationship intact.
Wartime urgency ensured a positive Canadian response to American 
proposals in 1942 and 1943. To reject their defence plans was out of the ques-
tion. In the early postwar years, however, the imperative for urgent action 
was less obvious. Reports from Canada’s analysts and diplomats did not 
spark fear of an imminent threat and the Americans could not convince the 
Canadians otherwise.25 Rather than conceding to American thinking on 
strategic matters, the Canadians actually held their ground on certain issues, 
investigated American requests, and evaluated them with the protection of 
their country’s interests in mind.26 As Canadian officials, especially those in 
the PJBD, engaged in bilateral defence planning and explored issues like the 
standardization of military equipment, they demonstrated that they could 
delay or reject proposals without fear of the United States taking drastic uni-
lateral action. When discussions shifted to the Arctic, this knowledge was 
essential. 
Officials were also far better prepared to carry out these defence discus-
sions than they had been during the war. Historian Elizabeth Elliot Meisel 
has argued that the failure of External Affairs to properly regulate American 
defence activities in Canada in 1942 stemmed from its small size and its rela-
tive inexperience. With a severe shortage of personnel, External Affairs had 
to set feasible priorities – which did not include the Canadian North early 
in the war – and did not plan for the difficult sovereignty issues that arose 
or develop an effective way of dealing with American pushiness. As the 
war progressed, however, External Affairs grew in size and sophistication 
and began to handle complex problems more effectively.27 Accordingly, the 
Canadians were much better prepared to meet the incoming onslaught when 
defence planning began to heat up in 1946. 
Planning the Defences
By early 1946 high-ranking Americans fully accepted the Soviet Union as an 
enemy and the threat to the continent as reality.28 If the Americans believed 
that the continent required defences, the Canadians would listen. They 
would not, however, be cajoled into making swift and damaging decisions.
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 By the spring, American defence planners began to pepper the 
Canadians with defence proposals aimed at improving their capabilities 
in the Arctic. The projects suggested for the Canadian Arctic Archipelago 
in March, April and May 1946 all sought to give the United States military 
greater knowledge of Arctic conditions. They did not demand large-scale in-
stallations, but relatively small operations with specific goals. On 14 March, 
Major General Guy V. Henry, American chairman of the PJBD, alerted his 
Canadian counterparts that the US War Department wanted to establish a 
program of photographic and virtual reconnaissance in the western Arctic 
Archipelago.29 From a military perspective, this project was sensible. The first 
step to any military operation is to understand the lay of the land; the recon-
naissance proposed by the Americans would have provided this essential 
knowledge. Any defence planning would also require detailed maps of the 
Canadian Arctic, which Ottawa did not have. Photographic reconnaissance 
would begin to resolve this problem. 
 Despite the military benefits inherent in the American request, the 
Canadians attempted to sidestep it. The Canadian Joint Staff told an American 
representative from the PJBD that the proposal created difficulties for the 
King government. They chose not to give a definitive answer regarding 
cooperation, nor did they give the Americans permission to act unilaterally.30 
Although the reasons for the Canadian rejection are not stated, they likely 
worried about the Americans exploring and taking pictures of a portion of 
the Canadian Arctic that remained unoccupied and barely explored. In this 
case, Canadian sovereignty trumped the defence needs of the Americans. 
 Undeterred by this initial rejection, in late April 1946 General Henry 
wrote to the Canadian secretary of the PJBD requesting permission for the 
USAAF to launch Operation Polaris, which would involve three B-29s flying 
three round trips per week over the Canadian Arctic.31 The rationale for the 
mission reflected the American desire to improve its operational capability 
in the region, especially in Arctic aviation. If American bombers ever had 
to cross the Polar Regions on a mission against the Soviet Union, the crews 
required advance training and their equipment needed to be tested in condi-
tions unique to the Arctic. The Canadians did not immediately respond to 
this proposal, however, and gave the issue more thought.
  At the end of April, the American section of the PJBD also requested 
the continuation of the low frequency long-range aid to navigation (Loran) 
program established in northern Canada to assist in the air and ground 
navigation for Exercise Musk Ox. The program consisted of three transmitter 
stations at Dawson Creek, Himli and Gimli, and monitoring stations oper-
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ated by the RCAF in Yellowknife, Norman Wells and Edmonton, the army 
at Baker Lake, and the Navy at Churchill. The United States operated and 
provided equipment for the transmitter stations, while Canada did the same 
for the monitoring sites and assisted in the messing, housing and transport 
for the American controlled stations. On 10 May 1946 Cabinet approved the 
extension of the Loran program until the following May.32 During that time, 
the program would work its way into the less secure areas of the Canadian 
Arctic. 
 In the early spring, an American proposal to establish a joint service 
testing station in the Canadian North also bounced around Ottawa. Both 
the Canadians and Americans agreed that the technical services required 
a space where they could test equipment in Arctic conditions. Many sug-
gested that the ideal location would be Fort Churchill, Manitoba, which was 
surrounded by a barren, Arctic landscape that was accessible year round 
by plane and rail.33 This proposal did not unduly worry the Canadians, but 
they still baulked at the idea of permitting the semi-permanent stationing of 
American troops in the North. 
 On 14 May 1946 the Americans also alerted the Canadian section of the 
PJBD that they wanted to carry out naval operations in the Arctic that sum-
mer. The objectives of Operation Nanook included the training of US naval 
personnel in Arctic operations and the recording of detailed hydrographic, 
electromagnetic and meteorological data. The Americans also sought 
Canadian permission to land a force of 28 Marines for a one-month period, 
preferably at Dundas Harbour on North Devon Island.34 The task force would 
operate from 1 July to 1 October in the waters of Viscount Melville Sound and 
Lancaster Sound, with several ships operating in the Northwest Passage.35 
An internal Canadian memorandum reviewing the project explored the pos-
sibilities of the expedition and noted the ships would operate in an “area 
that has seldom been penetrated before save in a spirit of adventure and 
with ships of less than half the size.” The report speculated on the possible 
commercial promise of the Northwest Passage, and highlighted the lack of 
Canadian activity in the area. The document also admitted that no Canadian 
naval ship ever entered the Arctic waters and no officers in the navy had any 
Arctic experience.36 Despite these glaring deficiencies, no one in Ottawa wor-
ried about Canada’s claim to its northern waters at this time, and the project 
did not stir up anxiety about sovereignty. 
 As important as these projects were to the Americans, they were more 
adamant that a chain of weather stations be established across the Arctic 
as quickly as possible. The roots of the proposed weather station program 
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stretched back into the war years. In the fall of 1944, Hugh Keenleyside re-
ceived a letter from Lt.-Colonel Charles Hubbard of the USAAF, who insisted 
that weather stations in the High Arctic would be essential to future military 
operations.37 The following March, Hubbard, who gained northern experi-
ence through his work on the Crimson Route, met with Escott Reid and 
Lester Pearson in the Canadian Embassy in Washington. Hubbard pointed 
out that the North Atlantic air routes required advanced weather forecasting. 
By 1944, forecasts for this area could only be made 24 hours in advance and 
remained unreliable. To solve this problem Hubbard envisioned six or seven 
stations spread across the Northwest Territories.38
 While the Canadians neither approved nor disapproved of such a scheme, 
Pearson commented that his government would be more comfortable with 
an international plan of action that covered Alaska, the Canadian Northwest 
Territories and Greenland.39 Pearson explained to Norman Robertson:
I pointed out to [Hubbard] that Canadians would look with some 
hesitation on meteorological stations in Canada’s northern areas 
unless they were under the control of Canada itself, or of an inter-
national organization set up with the knowledge and consent 
of Canada and in the control of which Canada shared. Colonel 
Hubbard quite appreciated this but suggested that some doubt 
still existed as to the extent of our sovereignty over some of these 
Arctic districts north of Canada.40
If Hubbard was trying to coax the Canadians into accepting his proposal on 
weather stations, raising questions about Canada’s sovereignty was a grave 
mistake. Robertson, however, was already aware of Hubbard’s ideas and 
he questioned senior officials at the Arctic, Desert and Tropic Information 
Centre of the USAAF about the plan. These officers told Robertson that 
Hubbard’s suggestions should be taken with a certain amount of reserve. 
“I gather that Hubbard is far from being persona grata to the Arctic experts 
of that organization who, in fact, managed some months ago to forestall his 
assignment work with them,” Robertson concluded.41 
 After Hubbard’s meeting with Reid and Pearson, the weather station 
proposal fell off the Canadian government’s radar. On the other side of the 
border, however, Hubbard remained hard at work trying to get someone in 
a position of power to champion his idea. He finally found a willing and 
powerful ear in Senator Owen Brewster of Maine, whom he convinced to 
propose a bill requesting funds for the United States Weather Bureau to “con-
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struct and operate meteorological stations in conjunction with a number of 
other countries.”42 As laid out in the Senate, the project would be initiated 
and controlled by a civilian agency. 
 In early May 1946 the Americans formally presented their plan for Arctic 
weather stations to the Canadian government. A memorandum from Lewis 
Clark, the Counselor at the US Embassy, proposed the establishment of three 
weather stations on islands in the western portion of Canada’s Arctic by the 
summer of 1947. Clark made it clear that, while the United States was pre-
pared to establish these stations independently, it “assumed that this would 
not be desired by the Canadian government in view of its general policy 
of retaining control of establishments in Canadian territory.” 43 In this light, 
Clark made two suggestions: that the United States establish and assist in 
maintaining the stations which would be under Canadian control or that 
Canada establish, operate and maintain the stations independently. 
 Most importantly, Clark “emphasized that his government wished to 
work out a programme on a fully cooperative basis and had no thought of 
interfering in any way with Canadian sovereignty.”44 Officials at External 
Affairs worried despite these assurances. Norman Robertson, the Under-
Secretary of State for External Affairs, told the Deputy Minister of Transport 
that Canada could not justify assuming the total cost of the project, but would 
also be in a precarious position if the Americans established and controlled 
the stations. Ideally, Canada required a compromise in which it retained con-
trol of the weather stations and made modest contributions to the program, 
while the U.S provided the supplies, necessary personnel and equipment.45 
 By mid-May 1946 Charles Hubbard again stood before the Canadians 
as a member of the American delegation at the first joint conference on the 
Arctic weather stations. All of the key departments on the Canadian side 
were represented at the conference, including Mines and Resources, the army 
and navy, the Department of Transport, External Affairs and the meteoro-
logical service. Hubbard reiterated the important role these weather stations 
could play in advanced forecasting and alluded to the military requirement 
for these stations when he argued that they would provide essential infor-
mation about flying conditions in the North. In addition, the United States 
Navy (USN) and AAF agreed to provide logistical support for the operation. 
Lewis Clark argued for a quick decision, stating that “the international polit-
ical situation at the present time is important. Those on the other side of the 
Arctic are very active. Because of this we can get funds at the present time 
and later this may not be possible.”46 With these funds the Americans hoped 
to establish weather stations at Winter Harbour on Melville Island in 1946, 
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and on Banks Island, Prince Patrick Island, and on the west side of Ellesmere 
Island or Axel Heiberg Island in 1947. Although the United States presented 
a sound plan and seemed respectful of Canadian sovereignty, the Canadians 
again refused to make a quick decision. 
Map 4. From Globe and Mail, 5 January 1946, in Shelagh Grant, Sovereignty or Security?: Gov-
ernment Policy in the Canadian North, 1936-1950 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia 
Press, 1988). 
 The defence projects proposed by the Americans in the first half of 
1946 made sound strategic sense and all had valuable non-military appli-
cations. They had practical and achievable aims and would not involve as 
many American personnel as the wartime mega-projects had required. The 
Americans also provided multiple assurances that these programs would 
not jeopardize Canadian sovereignty. These promises, however, did little to 
counter the de jure and de facto sovereignty concerns of the Canadian govern-
ment. In the aftermath of the joint conference on the weather stations, the 
Northwest Territories Council echoed the opinion of many Canadian officials 
when it claimed that it “was concerned about the aspect of sovereignty in 
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these remote sections of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago since most of these 
stations were going to areas where our claims on the basis of actual occupa-
tion are very weak.” The council noted that the sector principle had never 
been accepted internationally and that it believed any permanent northern 
projects should be operated by Canada.47 As valuable as these military pro-
jects might be, they could not be allowed to derogate Canada’s sovereignty in 
the North. 
Sovereignty Worries in the Arctic
By 1946 Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic Archipelago was best encapsulat-
ed by Hume Wrong’s phrase: “unchallenged, but not unchallengeable.”48 Since 
the early twentieth century Canada had taken slow but steady steps to secure 
its claim over the region. In the interwar period the Eastern Arctic Patrol vis-
ited remote stations almost every year, and Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
(RCMP) posts, post offices and customs houses dotted the mainland and 
archipelago up to Ellesmere Island. The government paid the Norwegians 
to drop their claims in the Canadian high Arctic and insisted that American 
expeditions entering the region acquire a Canadian permit. From time to 
time in the House of Commons a Canadian Minister would stand up and 
make mention of the Sector Principle and declare Canada’s intent to protect 
its Arctic islands.49 Other than the occasional statement, however, the govern-
ment showed little concern about the nature of Canada’s sovereignty in the 
Arctic and did even less to develop or settle the region. During the war, the 
Canadian government worried about its de facto control of the northwest, but 
only rarely was official attention directed to the Arctic islands. 
In 1944 a small number of officials in the Department of Mines and 
Resources and External Affairs had begun to ponder the nature of Canada’s 
sovereignty in the high Arctic. In February 1944, J.G. Wright, a member of the 
Northwest Territories Administration, noted that “it is the far and western 
islands, which are reached by our administration mostly in theory, where 
our claims to sovereignty are most likely to be questioned.” Wright explained 
that Russia strengthened its claims to its Arctic possessions by establishing 
scientific and weather stations in the area. He surmised that “we may have 
to do something like that ourselves, in which case we would require weather 
stations to service air travel to reach some of our otherwise scarcely access-
ible islands.”50 He urged Canada to adopt a more active approach to secure its 
own claims in the region. 
One of the few reports on the issue of Arctic sovereignty released 
by the Department of External Affairs during the war years argued the 
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necessity of effective occupation under international law. Any attempt to 
claim land based on discovery would generate possible rival claims from 
different nations that had explored the archipelago. The report concluded 
that the Arctic region required some degree of control and administration 
and “even taking into account that such ‘control and administration’ need 
not be as real in northern regions as in more temperate ones, there may 
be some doubt whether Canada is actually extending enough jurisdiction 
throughout lands already discovered to make her claim to these territor-
ies unquestionable.”51 The paper also recognized that there was no clear 
definition of effective administration and control. “The principle generally 
agreed to however, is that the possessing state must make its authority 
felt in the occupied territory and maintain order therein,” it noted. “As a 
matter of practice, I should think this is translated in the administration 
of justice and the enforcement of national laws and regulations in the ter-
ritory concerned.” The report mused that in the near future this control 
could be expanded to encapsulate stricter customs laws and regulations, 
air regulations, immigration control, and the enforcement of specific 
Northwest Territories (NWT) Acts, such as rules against the importation of 
intoxicants, game laws, and permits for foreign scientists and explorers.52 
Enforcing these regulations would strengthen Canada’s de facto control of 
the region. Accordingly, demonstrating a reasonable level of control, rather 
than making grand assertions of sovereignty based on discovery or the sec-
tor principle, became the government’s game plan. 
Other Canadian commentators shared a more positive interpretation of 
Canada’s legal claim to the Arctic. In response to Hubbard’s suggestion that 
some doubt existed as to the extent of Canadian sovereignty in the region, 
Charles Camsell, Deputy Minister of Mines and Resources, noted that three 
wartime publications issued with the consent of the US War Department 
“refer repeatedly to the islands north of the Canadian mainland as ‘the 
Canadian archipelago.’”53 A 1946 report prepared by the United States also 
employed the phrase “Canadian Arctic Archipelago.”54 These mentions, 
however, did not allay the concerns of Canadian decision-makers involved 
with continental defence planning. 
The American defence proposals called for activity in areas not perma-
nently settled or even patrolled by Canada, claimed using the sector theory 
which had no solid basis in international law. In particular, the weather sta-
tions would be established in areas that few Canadians ever visited and, in 
many cases, they would be the only settlements and sources of authority for 
hundreds of miles. The thought of tiny American-controlled stations pop-
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ping up throughout Canada’s Arctic, flying the stars and stripes, gravely 
worried all branches of the Canadian government. 
PJBD Recommendation 35, released in early May, did nothing to allevi-
ate the King government’s concerns. It attempted to establish the basic prin-
ciples for defence cooperation, calling for closer collaboration between the 
two countries in intelligence sharing, the interchange of personnel, equip-
ment standardization, joint manoeuvres and training, and the right of transit 
through either country’s territory. The recommendation, however, said little 
about the protection of sovereignty. The safeguards that the King govern-
ment had anticipated were absent. Rather than meekly signing on to these 
principles, Cabinet rejected the recommendation and ordered the PJBD to 
begin revising the proposal.55 This time, the Canadian section would push 
harder for clauses explicitly protecting Canada’s sovereignty.
The shortcomings in Recommendation 35 coincided with an equally 
frightening revelation from R.M. Macdonnell, the Canadian secretary of 
the PJBD. On 6 May 1946, he circulated a leaked report from the American 
Standing Sub-committee on the Arctic that called into question Canada’s 
sovereignty over undiscovered lands within its sector.56 The report, prepared 
in November 1945, explained that a gap existed in the network of Arctic 
aviation facilities extending from Spitsbergen to Greenland and across the 
“Canadian islands” to Alaska. To fill this gap, the paper suggested American 
reconnaissance flights to look for undiscovered islands in the Arctic upon 
which to establish weather stations. The committee questioned whether 
the United States recognized Canadian claims to the region north of Prince 
Patrick Island and west of Grant’s Land, and asked if the United States could 
claim newly discovered islands north of the Canadian mainland. 57 In short, 
the report dismissed Canadian claims to the region based on the Sector 
Principle. 
Though the low level-planning document carried little political weight in 
Washington, to a Canadian government already worried about sovereignty 
the report raised some unsettling possibilities. The Americans wanted to im-
prove their capabilities in the Arctic and, it seemed, they might test Canada’s 
de jure sovereignty to do so. The American report reinforced concerns ex-
pressed by Vice Chief of the General Staff General D.C. Spry that “hitherto 
unknown islands may be discovered within the Canadian sector by a foreign 
power, and claim laid to them by right of discovery and primary occupation.” 
Spry’s analysis criticized the lack of Canadian occupation, settlement, or de-
velopment in the area and noted the apparent weakness of Canada’s claims. 
“Thus it is of great importance that Canada should carefully safeguard her 
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sovereignty in the Arctic at all points and at all times,” Spry remarked, “lest 
the acceptance of an initial infringement of her sovereignty invalidate her 
entire claim.”58 
Solving Canada’s sovereignty concerns remained at the top of the list as 
the Canadian government and military became more entwined in continent-
al defence. A meeting of the Military Cooperation Committee (MCC) made 
resolving these concerns even more imperative. Canadian and American 
military delegations met to hammer out a revised version of ABC-22 from 
May 20-23, 1946. After a marathon session of planning and discussion, the 
MCC released an “Appreciation of the Requirements for Canadian-United 
States Security” and a “Joint Canadian-United States Basic Security Plan.” 
The documents stressed that the military potential of North America would 
be a major target in any outbreak of hostilities. In three to five years the of-
fensive capabilities of any potential enemy would steadily improve, making 
the continent more vulnerable to attack. If the enemy acquired the atomic 
bomb, an attack might come sooner and would be much more lethal. Any 
aerial attack would come over the North Pole, making use of Spitsbergen, 
Greenland, and the Canadian Arctic islands as stepping-stones to the con-
tinent. To protect the continent, the Canadians and Americans had to keep 
ahead of the enemy capabilities by building an integrated air defence system, 
air warning, weather forecasting, communications networks, surveillance, 
anti-submarine capabilities and mobile strike forces to counter any possible 
enemy lodgement in the north.59 The defence scheme of the MCC would force 
Canada to invest ten-fold more resources into continental defence and brace 
itself for a veritable Maginot Line in the Arctic. Acceptance of such a plan 
would also have a drastic impact on Canadian sovereignty. 
Defending Against Help
Canada was in a difficult position. Arnold Heeney, secretary to the Cabinet, 
informed Prime Minister King that continental defence would become 
the most serious problem facing the government in the postwar years. 
Considering the importance the Americans placed on securing a continental 
defence agreement, the Americans would probably approach Canada at the 
highest levels. “The government will probably have to accept the United 
States thesis in general terms,” Heeney concluded, “though we may be able to 
moderate the pace at which plans are to be implemented and to some extent 
the nature of the projects which are to be undertaken.”60
Historian Joseph Jockel has made a convincing case showing that the 
American government did not intend to establish a massive air defence sys-
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tem on Canadian territory in 1946. Despite the threat assessment prepared 
by the MCC, the USAAF remained predominately focused on offensive oper-
ations, not continental air defences, in the early postwar years.61 Jockel also 
noted that early bilateral “negotiations were conducted before the higher au-
thorities had fully established what, precisely, the American interest was.”62 
Furthermore, senior American officials tended to leave the details of bilateral 
defence planning in the hands of lower ranking officers and diplomats and 
often, as in the case of the MCC recommendation, knew little about the actual 
plans.63 These senior officials had little interest in the grandiose plans of the 
MCC, and suggestions for air defence bases and radar stations throughout 
the Arctic faded away for the short-term.
Regardless of the intentions of senior American officials, the plans pre-
pared by the MCC, the multitude of proposed northern defence projects, and 
the failure of the PJBD to create a set of basic principles for cooperation that 
protected Canadian sovereignty left the King government reeling by June 
1946. Everyone knew that Canada would participate in continental defence 
with its closest ally, in spite of its sovereignty concerns.64 Furthermore, 
Canadian military officials recognized the importance of the proposed 
defence projects. After the conference on weather stations in May, Group 
Captain Douglas Bradshaw, the RCAF representative, stated that he “hoped 
that the project would not be turned down on the basis of the sovereignty 
question as he felt there was a very great need of these stations for air activ-
ity in view of the rather disturbing political situation at the present time.”65 
The Canadian Arctic would be one of the front lines of any new global war. 
According to David Bercuson, this posed a series of important questions for 
policy makers: 
Did Canada have the resources to guard that front line to the 
satisfaction of its powerful ally, the United States? It was obvious, 
almost from the start, that it did not. But could Canada allow 
the United States to mount that “long polar watch” alone, from 
Canadian territory? Would this not be an admission that what-
ever sovereignty Canada claimed in the polar regions was weak 
at best and nonexistent at worst?66
How would Canada respond to the proposals for American defence projects 
in the Arctic? How would it protect its sovereignty in the region? 
Canada required a solution to its problem that both protected sovereign-
ty and provided adequate continental defence: it needed to “defend against 
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help.”67 The Canadians worried that the Americans might act unilaterally 
if they did not attempt to defend the Arctic, which the United States per-
ceived as a strategically vulnerable position. To effectively defend the Arctic, 
however, the Canadians had to partner up with the United States and allow 
American soldiers onto Canadian territory. This, in turn, would raise grave 
sovereignty concerns and in the process of securing the continent the United 
States itself would become a threat to Canada. Canadian diplomats realized 
that any policy in the Arctic would need to provide both sovereignty and 
security. Defence against help guaranteed both. 
Though this policy would eventually prove effective, the King govern-
ment continued to struggle to find the solution to its dilemma in the summer 
of 1946. By the beginning of June, the Americans began to press the Canadian 
government for a quick decision on the proposed defence projects, lest they 
miss the narrow window of opportunity for operations during the Arctic’s 
short summer. Canadian officials understood that their country had little 
choice but to participate in continental defence, but as American pressure 
mounted they became more determined to find a solution that would allay 
their sovereignty concerns. The government learned lessons from its war-
time experiences, and did not plunge head first into defence cooperation with 
the Americans by accepting every defence proposal immediately. Instead, 
the government bided its time, pondered the problem, and attempted to 
form a response that would protect Canada’s sovereignty and provide the 
American’s with the security they desired. 
An Activist Approach?
Throughout the spring and summer, several high-ranking officials proposed 
that Canada solve its sovereignty problems in the Arctic by aggressively 
pursuing formal American recognition of its claims. R.M. Macdonnell an-
ticipated that Arctic problems would be at the forefront of Canada’s foreign 
affairs in years ahead. Soon “there will be extensive programmes of northern 
exploration and development in which the United States will either be par-
ticipating with Canada or will have been given permission to act independ-
ently,” he predicted. With worrisome thoughts of American flags flying over 
bases in the Canadian Arctic flashing through his mind, Macdonnell sug-
gested that the Canadians go on the offensive from the start and “endeavour 
to secure [American] agreement to our claims about Canadian sovereignty.”68 
Lester Pearson echoed this sentiment when he suggested that Canada use 
the defence projects as leverage to attain from the Americans public recogni-
tion of Canada’s claims based on the sector principle.69 Both men advocated 
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an activist approach to Canadian sovereignty – a radical departure from the 
gradualist approach of the first half of the century. 
After the Canadian-American Arctic weather stations conference in 
May, James Allison Glen, the Minister of Mines and Resources, expressed 
his worry to Louis St. Laurent about the prospect of permanent American 
installations in a region where Canada did little to strengthen its sovereignty. 
Glen thought that the project was not as urgent as the American alleged, 
and he emphasized that any resolution should include “a clear and definite 
understanding” of Canadian sovereignty over the Arctic islands.70 Senior 
military officers seemed to agree that an aggressive offense was the best 
defence, and also advocated formal recognition of Canada’s claims. Charles 
Foulkes, the Chief of the General Staff, felt that “the whole question of 
Canadian sovereignty should be settled now, and that if weakness is shown 
at the present juncture it will only lead to increasing demands in future.”71 
A memorandum concerning the army’s position highlighted its agreement 
with the Department of Mines and Resources (DMR) and suggested that 
Canada work to gain “full title” to the islands on which defence installations 
might be built.72 The military’s leadership, usually so willing to work closely 
with the Americans, remained wary of their chief ally setting up permanent 
facilities in the Arctic during peacetime.
Historian Adam Lajeunesse alleges that Canada should have adopted 
the approach endorsed by Foulkes, Macdonnell and Pearson. Canada should 
have pushed the United States for acceptance of its claims, in return for the 
defence rights the Americans wanted in the Arctic.73 Certainly a dramatic 
activist approach had tremendous appeal. In theory, forcing the powerful 
Americans to bend to Canadian demands while solving, once and for all, 
Canada’s sovereignty worries is both alluring and idealistic. Given the world 
situation of 1946, this approach surely would have failed. Neither Pearson, 
Foulkes nor Macdonnell offered any evidence to support the assumption that 
the United States might have formally accepted Canada’s claims. Strategic 
and political considerations ensured that the Americans would not and 
could not accept a forceful Canadian request for sovereignty recognition. 
Although the State Department made it abundantly clear that the 
United States did not want to violate Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic, the 
Americans never offered to formally accept Canada’s claims in 1946.74 Global 
interests made such a declaration unrealistic, lest this be seen as acceptance 
of the sector principle. In 1926 the Soviet Union issued a decree that pro-
claimed its recognition of the sector theory and claimed an enormous swath 
of territory stretching from its eastern and western borders to the North Pole. 
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Even if the United States did not object to Canada’s sectoral claims in prin-
ciple, it did not want to strengthen the position of the Russians. Any formal 
acceptance of Canada’s claims would have done just that. 
The Antarctic Connection to Canada’s Arctic
American political and strategic interests in the Antarctic also dictated its re-
sponse. In the first decades of the twentieth century countries used the sector 
principle to claim vast portions of the southern polar continent. The United 
States government refused to do so, and stated in 1924 that no Antarctic claim 
could be made unless it satisfied a strict definition of effective occupation far 
more stringent than the British version for polar regions (which only called for 
the occasional visit and legislative act).75 In September 1929, the United States 
Navy Department criticized the sector principle as an illegal attempt by a few 
of the world’s powers to unfairly divide up a large portion of the globe.76 
After the war the United States began preparing its territorial claim in 
the Antarctic, and the strategic importance of the continent grew as the Soviet 
Union began to express an interest in the region. The USN began planning 
for a massive military project in the Antarctic, Operation Highjump, initiated 
in August 1946 and involving 13 ships, nine aircraft and 4700 personnel. That 
December, Dean Acheson, the Acting Secretary of State, indicated the polit-
ical importance of the American Antarctic expedition when he claimed that 
the operation highlighted “a definite policy of exploration and use of those 
Antarctic areas to which we already have a reasonable basis for claim…in or-
der that we may be in a position to advance territorial claims to those areas.” 
Highjump, and a later expedition known as Windmill, provided the Americans 
with a firm foundation for claims based on effective occupation.77 
Between 1946 and 1948 the State Department crafted the American claim 
in the Antarctic. Samuel Boggs, the State Department’s Geographic Adviser 
and the man responsible for these plans, ignored all sector claims on the con-
tinent and formulated an American claim based on discovery and effective 
occupation. As long as the sector principle was not established in international 
law, the United States government could argue for a portion of the Antarctic 
that it considered both accessible and economically attractive.78 Any recogni-
tion of the sector principle in one polar region would have established a pre-
cedent for the other, to the detriment of the American position in the Antarctic.
As long as the Americans rejected the sector claims in the Antarctic, 
they could also continue to operate in any area of the region they chose. The 
American military considered the Antarctic to be valuable for training and 
experimentation. Learning to cope with the extreme conditions could prepare 
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men and equipment for deployment in the Arctic, while avoiding the political 
sensitivities involved with undertaking a project the size of Highjump in the 
Canadian archipelago.79 Senior American officials realized that they would 
lose this ability to train and prepare their forces for war against the Soviets 
if they accepted the sector theory in the Arctic.80 Accordingly, if Canada had 
insisted on formal American recognition of its sovereignty in the early post 
war years, based on the sector principle, the United States would have in-
evitably rejected its request, weakening any Canadian legal claim based on 
foreign acquiescence.
If the situation in the Antarctic made acceptance of the sector principle 
impossible for the Americans, what was their opinion of Canadian sover-
eignty in the region? Two documents from this period illuminate American 
thinking on the matter. While at times critical of Canadian claims, both 
reports endorsed cooperation rather than unilateral American action. In 
early 1946 Lt. Colonel James Brewster, Assistant Chief of Intelligence, Atlantic 
Division Air Transport Command, noted that international acceptance of a 
territorial claim and effective occupation were the only ways to take posses-
sion of a territory. Brewster pointed out, however, that the rigid American 
conception of effective occupation did not align with the precedents estab-
lished by international law. In 1933, the Eastern Greenland Case decided that 
Denmark had demonstrated sufficient authority over parts of Greenland to 
claim the entire area as its own, although this jurisdiction was manifested 
solely by Danish legislative acts which could not be effectively enforced in 
most of the territory involved. The case indicated that the administration 
established for areas like the Canadian Arctic could be adapted to local con-
ditions and meet only local requirements. Brewster recognized that develop-
ment or mass settlement of the region was not required.81 
Although the report acknowledged Canadian efforts to assert their 
sovereignty in the Arctic, Brewster maintained the northernmost regions 
of North America remained susceptible to foreign intrusion. These islands 
“represent[ed] either a potential spearhead pointed at Europe,” he noted, “…
or, on the other hand, an especially vulnerable area, a possible spring-board 
for any foreign assault on the North American continent.” Brewster did not 
suggest the United States take immediate unilateral action in the Arctic, or 
that it should look for undiscovered islands to claim. Instead, he called for 
joint defence activity in the region, including patrols and the deployment of a 
network of meteorological, radio and air stations to ensure effective occupa-
tion before some other foreign power did so.82 The United States, after all, 
would much rather see Canadians in the Arctic Archipelago than Russians. 
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A second report entitled, “Problems of Canadian-United States 
Cooperation in the Arctic,” also came from the intelligence branch of the 
Atlantic Division, Air Transport Command.83 Released in October 1946, 
the paper claimed that, while many of Canada’s senior military advisers 
understood the interdependence of the two countries in continental secur-
ity, many Canadians opposed any American military presence in the Arctic 
during peacetime lest it erode Canadian sovereignty. The Americans, how-
ever, did not want to challenge Canada’s position in the Arctic, and while 
they may have thought that the Canadians had not done enough to effect-
ively occupy the region, “in light of the latter decision [East Greenland], 
we are forced to conclude that the Canadian claim to sovereignty over the 
entire American Arctic would be sustained by an international judicial 
body.”84 
There would, of course, be a backlash if the United States seized islands 
that Canada considered its own. The Air Transport Command report listed 
Prince Patrick Island, Banks Island and Grant Land as the only locations that 
the American government could occupy with any hope of making a legal 
defence of its actions. While such an occupation might be technically legal, 
the violation of Canadian territorial rights “would lead to repercussions so 
severe that the violation, except in the case of emergency, would not be worth 
it.” The report emphasized that the United States should not undertake a 
unilateral program of polar defence. Cooperation was preferable, even if this 
meant grappling with Canada’s sovereignty concerns in ways that did not 
prejudice American interpretations of international law. In short, the United 
States could not accept the sector principle, but it did not seek to undermine 
Canada’s sovereignty either. 
Historian Shelagh Grant used the October 1946 report on the problems 
of Canadian-American defence cooperation in the Arctic as proof of diabol-
ical American intentions. In her view, the Americans consistently considered 
undertaking the defence of the Arctic unilaterally and thought seriously of 
annexing certain Canadian islands.85 This judgement stems from a problem-
atic reading of the primary sources. In the end, this was a low-level planning 
document prepared by a low-ranking officer attached to a unit that was one 
small part of USAAF. “Sweeping internally generated ‘think’ pieces, discuss-
ing hypothetical situations does not represent actual policy,” David Bercuson 
explained in a review of Grant’s book. “In fact, there is not a shred of evi-
dence that any top-level US policy body ever disputed Canada’s claims to the 
Arctic Archipelago.”86 While the paper investigated unilateral action in the 
Canadian Arctic, it actually concluded that Canadian sovereignty must be 
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respected, even informally recognized by Washington. The report advocated 
cooperation, not coercion or intimidation.
The majority of Canadian officials understood that the Americans would 
not approve the sector principle. American proposals never suggested the 
acceptance of the principle and often implicitly rejected the theory. One of 
the clearest examples of this came in September 1946, when the American 
section of the PJBD announced the intention of the United States to establish 
a Great Circle Flying Route from the West Coast to Tokyo. General Henry 
explained to the Canadian Section that these planes would not fly over terri-
tory between 60° and 142° without permission from Canada. The Canadian 
report noted that “the selection of 142° as the Western limit rather than 141° 
which is the boundary between Alaska and Canada, was made so as to avoid 
giving support to the Sector principle.”87 Officials in External Affairs also 
recognized American concerns about the sector principle in the Antarctic 
and suggested not placing the United States government in a position where 
it had to officially reject Canada’s application of the theory in the Arctic.88 
Canadian diplomat Hume Wrong understood the situation best. From 
the start he realized that the Antarctic interests of the United States would 
keep it from publically endorsing the sector principle. In fact, Wrong dis-
suaded Pearson from adopting a more aggressive approach to the Arctic. A 
gradualist approach to sovereignty seemed to be Canada’s best option. For 
many years Canada proceeded without “difficulty on the assumption that 
our sovereignty was not challenged,” Wrong observed. “A declaration of this 
sort would revive discussion of an issue which may in practice turn out to 
have been closed.”89 In addition, while the Antarctic prevented the United 
States from accepting Canada’s claims, Wrong realized the region provided 
a testing ground for the principles of polar sovereignty. He maintained “that 
it now seems probable that the Antarctic area rather than the Arctic will 
provide the field for working out general rules of international law concern-
ing the relative merits of claims based on occupancy, formal annexation and 
discovery…There is a long way to go, however, before a generally recognized 
definition of what constitutes effective occupancy can be developed.”90 
Rather than risk a unilateral assertion of Canada’s sovereignty, why not wait 
and see if developments in the southern polar region clarified the situation 
in the Arctic?
Although several prominent officials still promoted an activist approach 
to Arctic sovereignty, others supported Wrong’s views. On 8 May 1946, E.R. 
Hopkins, a member of External Affairs’ Third Political Division, advised “we 
should not raise any question concerning our sovereignty in the Arctic in 
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advance of necessity.” Instead, the government required time to consolidate 
its knowledge about Arctic sovereignty and establish a firm position before 
it made any decision.91 Since the days of O.D Skelton, External Affairs had 
promised to update its file on sovereignty in the North. By the summer of 
1946, the department still had done nothing.92 Soon an in depth exploration of 
Canada’s sovereignty in the North, and ways to safeguard it, was underway. 
Debating the Options
Given the relatively permanent nature of the Arctic weather stations and the 
long-term plan proposed by the Americans, the most substantive discussions 
revolved around this proposed program. A few public servants believed that 
Canada should take full responsibility for the weather stations, erecting and 
operating all of the facilities itself. The Northwest Territories Council ques-
tioned why Canada, after spending an obscene amount of money buying 
back all the wartime American bases in the North, would once again invite 
the U.S. into the region?93 Canada might as well construct, operate, supply 
and man the stations on her own, rather than spend money to purchase them 
from the U.S. later.94 The Minister of Mines and Resources took this idea ser-
iously and recommended to External Affairs that: 
Canada should establish and operate any necessary stations 
even if U.S. official publications admit Canada’s sovereignty. This 
looks like one of those defence (?) proposals that seem as though 
we were getting everything for nothing at the beginning and 
then we wake up after a while to find that the U.S. Senate has 
turned everything upside down and that the U.S diplomats are 
back again to ask us to pay for work we could have done better 
and more cheaply ourselves.95
After the joint weather stations conference in May, J.G. Wright, the Acting 
Superintendant of the Eastern Arctic, proposed that if Canada scraped the 
bottom of the barrel in the Meteorological Service and the military it might 
be able to find enough personnel to operate the stations.96 
Most Canadian officials, however, recognized that it would be impos-
sible for Canada to independently establish and operate such stations in the 
Arctic. Representatives from Canada’s Meteorological Service complained 
that to supply the necessary personnel to operate the proposed station, they 
would have to close at least one, and possibly two, current stations. They also 
doubted the likelihood of recruiting enough qualified personnel to staff all of 
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the proposed Arctic stations. Andrew Thomson and Commander Edwards 
noted that Canada’s position on sovereignty seemed “unduly cautious,” and 
Edwards suggested that Canada only needed to supply three of the ten staff 
members when the first stations were established. (In the future, this number 
could increase so that Canadians made up at least half of all weather station 
personnel.)97 In his sober appraisal, this personnel ratio would effectively 
protect Canada’s claims. Other officials also worried about the high cost of 
taking on the project alone, and thought that surely some American invest-
ment should be accepted.98
At the end of May, the Department of External Affairs produced a memo-
randum discussing the different courses of action available to Canada.99 Either 
the United States or Canada could undertake the weather station program 
independently, although sovereignty concerns and the huge price tag made 
this option unattractive. The King government could refuse to cooperate with 
the project, although this would elicit a strong reaction from the United States 
and, in a worst case scenario, could lead to unilateral American action. The 
Canadians might defer decision on the program until a joint planning group 
could go over the plans and establish the specific parameters of the project. 
Finally, approval could be given immediately for the program, with the stipu-
lation that it be a joint project with as many Canadian observers as possible.100 
In External Affairs’ opinion, none of the courses of action did enough to 
protect Canada’s sovereignty. It wanted to create a set of guidelines for the 
weather station program that would safeguard Canada’s claims and control 
over the Arctic. Acknowledging American assurances that Canadian sover-
eignty would not be threatened, the Department suggested that the weather 
stations program be approved as a joint project so long as Canada controlled 
the stations, the United States had no vested interests or claims in the facili-
ties, Canadians replaced American personnel as soon as possible, and the 
two countries shared the annual operating costs.101 This approach reflected 
the steps taken during the final years of the war to gain control of the defence 
projects in the Northwest. Using these tested methods, the Canadians hoped 
to secure their sovereignty. 
Major General D.C. Spry’s report listed the same possible courses of ac-
tion as the External Affairs memorandum. The general embraced the idea 
of establishing a clear set of formal guidelines for all defence projects in the 
North. Spry added that the Americans should be required to seek permis-
sion before starting any exercise or project on or over Canadian territory, that 
the majority of personnel involved at permanent installations be Canadian, 
that Canadians participate in all projects (even if only as observers), and that 
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any publicity on the projects stress their joint nature.102 The Cabinet Defence 
Committee accepted his recommendations at its meeting on 6 June 1946.103 At 
last, the Canadians seemed ready to offer the Americans a positive answer 
on their Arctic defence projects. 
Deferring the Decision
As Canadian officials discussed their preferred course of action, the United 
States attempted to hasten a Canadian decision. At first the Americans tried 
to alleviate Canadian concerns by making the northern defence plans appear 
less threatening. For instance, the original plan for the weather stations pro-
gram called for extensive air facilities at the Melville Island site. In early June, 
the Americans informed the Canadian government that “this programme 
has now been scaled down considerably. Strategic Air Command have been 
put in charge instead of Air Transport Command and they do things more 
simply than the somewhat grandiose Air Transport people.” Strategic Air 
Command downgraded the proposed permanent airstrips to small scale 
temporary ones.104 When these changes failed to elicit a quick and favourable 
Canadian response, however, the United States government re-applied pres-
sure to expedite the Canadian decision.105 
 Unwilling to make a decision without King (who was in England at the 
time), the Cabinet decided to defer decision on the weather stations at their 
meeting on 12 June 1946.106 As the month went on, worries continued to sur-
face about Canada’s interests and continental security. On 21 June Pearson 
told Norman Robertson that he asked “the War Department…not press us 
too hard with urgent requests for quick action in the field of defence in the 
North. I said that, while developments in the north were perhaps relatively 
small items in the defence plans of this country, they were for us matters 
of great importance, strategically and politically.”107 In a letter to Arnold 
Heeney, Hume Wrong noted that the United States utilized “a number of 
different channels in an effort to extract a prompt and favourable decision.” 
The Canadian government was still in a precarious position.108 
 Prime Minister King returned from England to find the weather sta-
tions one of the most pressing issues on his agenda. In his discussions with 
several key British politicians, the real prospect of a Soviet war of conquest 
loomed large and his British peers suggested he reach a defence agreement 
with the Americans.109 King understood the magnitude of the situation and 
considered continental defence to be necessary. Nonetheless, he would not 
rush into a decision without taking careful steps to protect his country’s in-
terests – and his legacy. 
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 At a 27 June Cabinet meeting, King and his ministers decided to deny 
the American request to start the weather station program that summer.110 
The Prime Minister emphasized that the government required more time 
to study the general problem of continental defence and to formulate a co-
herent policy.111 The absence of formal guidelines regulating the Canadian-
American defence relationship and unresolved questions about the extent of 
Canada’s participation in the project troubled the government.112 King would 
not take risks without an urgent threat forcing Canada’s hand, so his govern-
ment adopted a cautious policy of delaying decisions on continental defence 
until the complex situation could be sorted out to Canada’s benefit. 
 On 2 July R.M. Macdonnell informed a disappointed Lewis Clark about 
the Canadian decision over the telephone, carefully noting that this “did not 
rule out future consideration of the project.” In his memorandum describ-
ing the Canadian decision, Macdonnell argued that “there were not lacking 
indications of developments not calculated to increase Canadian confidence 
in the intentions of some United States officials. Some irresponsible enthusi-
asts in lower levels in Washington were known to have made ill considered 
remarks about the possibility of raising the Stars and Stripes in unoccupied 
Arctic territory.” The Americans, for instance, had already collected vast 
amounts of material for the project and started to recruit personnel for ser-
vice in the Arctic. These hasty actions did little to alleviate Canadian concern 
about American intentions. After hearing the decision, Clark relayed the 
disappointment of the United States government and Macdonnell expected 
that the Americans would continue to place pressure on the Canadian gov-
ernment to accept defence plans.113
 Despite Macdonnell’s fears, the Americans actually shifted tactics. 
In August and September, the State Department and the United States 
military stopped pressuring the Canadians to accept continental defence 
proposals. Instead, they set about reassuring their Canadian counterparts. 
Major General Victor Henry wrote to Graham Parsons and explained why 
he believed the Canadians resisted the American defence plans. Henry 
argued that Canada’s response was shaped by the large costs, the perceived 
threat to sovereignty, the possibility of negative public opinion, unwilling-
ness to desert the Commonwealth in favour of the United States, and the 
fear of becoming another Belgium. To fix these insecurities, he suggested, 
“Canadian public opinion must be convinced of a potential threat before the 
Dominion Government will feel fully justified in carrying out this new, and 
from a Canadian point of view, revolutionary policy.” The General urged 
that the two countries reach an agreement in principle on defence to show 
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the Canadian public that their government took the threat to the continent 
seriously and to alleviate Canadian sovereignty fears.114
 In early September, Henry attempted to convince the Canadian section 
of the PJBD to reach an agreement on continental defence. The international 
situation dictated that the “security of the homeland of both Canada and the 
United States is unalterably bound up one with the other and will require the 
utmost of coordination.” He emphasized that the American High Command 
did not want to violate Canada’s sovereignty or its rights: it was a purely 
military problem that required joint defence cooperation.115 Despite Henry’s 
best efforts, the Canadians continued to defer their decision. 
 At this critical juncture, the British added their input into the situa-
tion. As King struggled to make a decision, Bernard Montgomery, the 
chief of the Imperial General Staff, paid a visit to Canada and met with 
the Prime Minister and key military personnel. The old soldier, whom 
King held in high regard, insisted that there would be another war in ten 
to fifteen years. “There was no possibility of Russia attempting to invade 
the North American continent at any time during the next fifteen years,” 
Montgomery noted, “but … she might attempt air raids either direct or 
from a base, or bases, established in the Arctic Islands.”116 Although the 
inaccessibility of the North provided some security for the continent, 
Montgomery recommended implementing an air defence scheme to thwart 
any Soviet raid across the northern approaches. If Canada could not afford 
such a scheme on its own, he urged that it reach an agreement with the 
Americans.117 King, however much he respected Monty’s opinion, still kept 
the American’s waiting. 
 While the Canadian government stubbornly withheld permission for 
permanent projects in the Arctic like the weather stations, they tried to ap-
pease the Americans by approving less ambitious projects throughout the 
summer. Despite misgivings about the Americans overflying the Arctic, 
the Cabinet Defence Committee (CDC) accepted the proposal for Operation 
Polaris. In the middle of June the government also approved Operation 
Nanook, as long as the USN adopted a less “military” sounding title. If the 
United States needed to land Marines somewhere in the Canadian Arctic, the 
Canadians requested Dundas Harbour, where an RCMP detachment dem-
onstrated Canadian sovereignty.118 Cabinet also decided to allow the United 
States to continue to operate certain weather stations in the southern portion 
of the Canadian North.119 Although the Americans appreciated these con-
cessions, they grew increasingly restless for action on the larger continental 
defence projects as fall began. 
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Bringing the Canadians to the Table
On 19 September 1946 the PJBD amended its 35th Recommendation to bet-
ter protect the sovereignty of both countries.120 King, however, still refused 
to sign off on the recommendation until he had a better understanding of 
American defence plans for the Arctic. By October, acting Secretary of State 
Dean Acheson suggested to President Truman that the Canadians might 
require a nudge before they agreed to defence collaboration. “The planning 
and application of joint defence measures remains the most active of our cur-
rent relations with Canada,” Acheson explained. “Our military authorities 
are naturally insistent on closing the gap between Alaska and Greenland 
and on pushing the defence of our industrial centers north of our border. 
For this we are dependent on the cooperation of the Canadian government.” 
Acheson understood that this decision was a matter of great importance to 
the Canadians, who worried about the political risk and the danger it posed 
to their sovereignty.121 He urged the President to tell King that the civilian 
members of the United States Administration, and not just the military, 
wanted more defence cooperation.122 
 As the State Department grew increasingly anxious, Hume Wrong 
observed that the Canadians still did not have a clear understanding of 
US planning or American conclusions about the Soviet threat. Wrong also 
commented to King that there “is still…a lot to be learned in Washington 
about our position and our problems.” Closer military cooperation was 
necessary, but Wrong did not believe that such a relationship should be 
based on the current defence appreciation created by the MCC. 123 He urged 
King to tell the President that the Canadians wanted high-level diplomatic 
discussions to determine exactly what the Americans really planned for 
the Arctic. 
 During a meeting at the White House on 28 October 1946, Truman 
attempted to get King on the same page about continental defence. The 
President stressed the need for cooperation, and spoke on the value of the 
Arctic weather stations. Truman approached the situation calmly and did 
not place undue pressure on the Prime Minister. The next day, however, King 
received an oral communiqué from the President that presented quite a dif-
ferent message. Truman urged the Canadians to quickly approve the defence 
scheme created by the MCC and to concur to PJBD Recommendation 35 and 
its principles regulating continental defence.124 
 On 12 November 1946, Lester Pearson responded. Any discussion on 
defence needed to take into consideration the world political situation, and 
the fact that Canada could not escape a global conflict if one broke out. It 
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would be extremely difficult to work out a tolerable relationship with the 
Soviet Union as long as it was “governed by ruthless despots” and inhabited 
by “millions of fighting men to whom life is hard and cheap.” Armed con-
flict remained unlikely in the next few years, but “the way the world is now 
going, there can only be one ultimate result – war.”125 Canada had obliga-
tions in continental defence, Pearson stressed, and had to cooperate with the 
Americans. It was time to commit.
 During meetings of the Cabinet Defence Committee on 14 and 15 
November, officials debated Canada’s next move. Many urged that Canada 
accept Recommendation 35 to give the two countries some principles on 
cooperation with which to work. However, Brooke Claxton, who in a month 
would become the Minister of National Defence, reminded all present of 
the fundamental difference between the viewpoints of the Americans and 
Canadians.126 In the end, the Canadians wanted to accept the principles 
of defence cooperation as proposed by the PJBD, but remained wary of 
American intentions for the Arctic. On 21 November 1946, senior Canadian 
and American officials, led by Pearson and Atherton, met to lay the ground-
work for high-level defence discussions that would hopefully answer all of 
Canada’s questions about American intentions.127 Interestingly, one of the 
few subjects that the Americans stated they would not discuss was the sector 
principle,128 because this was not a basis upon which they could officially 
support Canada’s claims. If any Canadian officials still believed that a for-
mal recognition of Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic based on the sector 
principle would be forthcoming from the Americans, their hopes were now 
finally dashed. 
Two Days in December
On 16 December 1946 senior Canadian officials found themselves sitting 
across from their American counterparts in the Chateau Laurier, Ottawa. 
Given the sensitive nature of the discussions the meeting was kept as 
secret as possible and the military men arrived at the hotel in their civil-
ian clothes to avoid drawing any undue attention. Over the next two cold 
winter days, the allies attempted to work out a deal on bilateral defence 
cooperation that would provide for American security concerns without 
sacrificing Canada’s national interests. Of all the defence meetings between 
the Canadians and Americans following the war, this one stands out as the 
most important. Both sides came to the negotiating table willing to com-
promise and these men worked out the principles for a defence relationship 
that would last for years and have a significant impact on Canadian inter-
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ests and sovereignty. Out of the meeting emerged an informal relationship, 
based on careful negotiations and agreement. “In the all important area of 
joint defence planning, both sides agreed that all the defence plans were 
‘somewhat utopian’ and that their implementation had to be ‘decided step 
by step,’ with the rate of implementation ‘under constant review,’” conclud-
ed David Bercuson.129 The Canadians also discovered that the Americans 
had little interest in creating a vast air defence system, which undoubtedly 
soothed their anxieties.130
 The Americans conducted the meeting in a friendly and informal man-
ner, sending some of their best men for the occasion (including George 
Keenan, the resident Russian expert).131 Political scientist Denis Smith has 
asserted that “as the diplomatic catalyst of the policy of firmness, and the 
American diplomat most respected by the Canadian Department for his judg-
ment of the Soviet Union, Keenan was an inspired choice for the American 
delegation.”132 These men made a reasonable case and allowed the Canadians 
to draw their own conclusions. They did not attempt to “present demands 
or to insist on certain things being done.”133 Indeed, the Americans behaved 
impeccably.
 “So far from being in an excitable or panicky frame of mind, the 
Americans had shown themselves very cool, level headed and realistic,” a 
Canadian report on the meeting observed.134 The American contingent told 
the Canadians that, while they did not believe a war would break out in 
the near future, measures should be taken to safeguard the continent. “In 
their general game of power politics Russians usually carried on with their 
bludgeoning tactics until ‘A quarter of an hour before midnight,’ and only 
modified their policy at the last minute.”135 The North American continent 
required defences if they decided to go “five minutes past midnight.” The 
Americans believed that Arctic defences were long-term insurance, and 
they promised that any defence plan would proceed cautiously and grad-
ually year-by-year, based on the international situation.136 The Canadians 
questioned the Americans extensively about their global strategy and were 
pleased to hear that the US strategic focus remained offensive in nature.137 
For the most part, Canadian and American officials at the meeting saw eye-
to-eye on Soviet intentions and the steps required to counter the communist 
threat. 
 The Americans also told the Canadians exactly what they had in mind 
for the North. They did not want to dash into grandiose proposals, but 
“seemed as anxious as the Canadians to keep the whole business as modest 
as possible.”138 The United States wanted weather and Loran stations in the 
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Arctic, but Pearson acknowledged that these proposals were moderate and 
benign. Financing would be discussed for each specific proposal and allot-
ted proportionately. “The general intention,” he explained, “would be that 
the Canadians should themselves finance in toto any measures which they 
themselves would have undertaken for their own purposes apart altogether 
from United States interest.”139 The American proposals would not unduly 
burden Canada’s budget and promised to assist in the development of the 
North. 
 Pearson felt that this quieter tempo on the part of the Americans 
resulted largely from six months of stalling on the Canadian side.140 The 
Americans recognized Canadian insecurities about sovereignty and made 
the price of defence cooperation significantly easier to bear. They agreed 
on a policy of firmness and patience. Accordingly, Canada finally commit-
ted to a joint continental defence agreement. Canada’s de jure sovereignty 
would be protected and its rights respected. On 16 January 1947 Cabinet ap-
proved the final version of Recommendation 35, which laid out regulatory 
principles for all continental defence projects. Renamed Recommendation 
36, the document represented, in the words of David Bercuson, “an explicit 
U.S assurance to Canada that the United States had no wish to violate the 
de jure sovereignty Canada claimed over the north.”141 All defence pro-
jects would remain under the control of the host country, no permanent 
rights would be granted to the visiting forces, and both countries would 
study each project individually and approve all public statements about 
the defence projects.142 The Recommendation ensured that the principles of 
bilateral defence cooperation safeguarded Canada’s sovereignty and pro-
tected its interests. By February these provisions had been applied to the 
weather stations program, and the contested project was finally approved. 
It had been a long road, but the negotiations of 1946 finally paid off for both 
countries.
* * *
 After the meeting at the Chateau Laurier, Canadian policy-makers 
lost some of their reservations about cooperating with the United States in 
continental defence. As the defence relationship between the two countries 
began to heat up, however, and the Arctic became the scene of more activity, 
the Canadian government still worried about its de facto sovereignty. Paper 
agreements were important, but Canada still needed to maintain control of 
developments on the ground. Despite minor indiscretions, most Americans, 
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especially high-ranking ones, would apply the spirit of the defence principles 
on the ground in the North. This respectful attitude, coupled with Canada’s 
growing ability to maintain control of events on the ground, would effect-
ively safeguard Canada’s de facto sovereignty.
 In 1946 the Canadians adopted a different attitude towards their de-
fence relationship with the Americans than they had in the Second World 
War. They tried to be more assertive and defensive in handling their close 
ally, and they succeeded by continuing to learn from their mistakes and 
improving their efforts to control activities. Officials, especially those from 
External Affairs, worked to delay defence planning and decision-making, 
allowing time to ponder problems and formulate appropriate responses. 
Rather than capitulating to pressure and rushing to fill the Arctic with 
defence projects desired by the United States, Canadian decision-makers 
dictated the pace at which security planning progressed to suit their own 
interests. They adopted a strategy of defending against help and, while it 
was not the most dramatic plan, it allowed the Canadians to secure their 
sovereignty effectively while leaving the primary financial burden for de-
fence on their key ally. 
 In 1946 the Canadian government was constrained by security concerns, 
international law, and the strategic interests of the United States. In the con-
text of the time, the Canadians adopted the only realistic policy available 
to them: gradual acquisition. The Americans would have rejected any ac-
tivist assertion attempting to trade defence rights for a public recognition 
of Canada’s sovereignty based on the sector principle. In turn, Canada’s 
quiet diplomacy secured de jure sovereignty over its terrestrial claims in the 
Arctic. The policy of ‘agreeing to disagree,’ used so effectively by Mulroney 
and Reagan in response to the voyage of the Polar Sea, (see chapter 13) did 
not appear out of thin air. They adopted an old and familiar position that 
had roots in the defence negotiations of 1946. Canada and the United States 
found space to coexist in the name of continental defence, finding a solu-
tion to Canada’s sovereignty woes that both governments could accept while 
averting intractable disagreements on core legal issues. Franklyn Griffiths 
and other commentators continue to suggest that a functional Canadian 
approach to managing and controlling its internal waters, based on “agree-
ing to disagree” with the Americans on the legal status of the Northwest 
Passage, remains a feasible and realistic option. Such a policy has proven 
effective since 1946, and may remain the key to managing bilateral relations 
in the twenty-first century Arctic.143
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